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Between Rules and Discretion:  
Thoughts on Ordo-Liberalism 
 
 
Jonathan White 
London School of Economics 
The chapter examines how efforts to design a policy regime governed by rules may lead 
on the contrary to recurrent and far-reaching political discretion. Where re-
orientations of policy are formally excluded, as in the Ordo-liberal perspective, 
unforeseen situations will typically provoke last-minute unconventional actions, 
whether in the form of temporary exceptions to the existing framework or moves to 
constitute a new one. In order to preserve the ideal of a rule-governed order, such 
actions must be cast as extraordinary measures for exceptional times – as the politics of 
emergency, that is. Whereas modern political thought of various stripes tends to defend 
constitutional rules as the condition of policy discretion, here one sees the converse 
scenario of constitutional discretion pursued in the name of policy rules. These themes 
are elaborated in connection with the ongoing crisis of the European Union. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The politics of the Euro crisis, and Germany’s role within it, are commonly described in two 
diverging ways: on the one hand as displaying new heights of executive discretion, on the 
other as exhibiting an extreme attachment to the imposition of constraining rules.
1
 How are 
we to account for these apparently contrasting depictions? 
Currently the most popular interpretation seems to be this: that the prominence of 
rules both in discourse and practice derives from the influence of Ordo-liberal thought, while 
the prominence of discretion results from the incomplete application of these ideas.
2
 Ordo-
liberalism is the structuring ideal, but remains only partially realised. There is at least one 
further possibility of course, which is that the combination of discretion and rules is itself 
characteristic of Ordo-liberalism. On this reading, both rules and extraordinary measures 
                                                 
1
  See on the one hand Fritz Scharpf, “Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Are”, in: Sara Hobolt 
and Olaf Cramme (eds), Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), on the other hand Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Max Watson, “Sharing the Eurocrats’ dream: a 
demoicratic approach to EMU governance in the post-crisis era”, in: Damian Chalmers, Markus 
Jachtenfuchs and Christian Joerges (eds.), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European 
Diversity (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), pp.50-77., esp p.52: ‘rules now reign supreme’.  
2
  See, for example, Lars P. Feld, Ekkehard A. Köhler and Daniel Nientiedt, “Ordoliberalism, Pragmatism and 
the Eurozone Crisis: How the German Tradition Shaped Economic Policy in Europe”, CESIFO WORKING 
PAPER NO. 5368, 2015. 
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have their place in the Ordo-liberal outlook, and the presence of both in the contemporary EU 
is consistent with the structuring influence of Ordo-liberalism. This is the possibility I would 
like to explore here. 
II.  THE IDEA OF AN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 
If there is a core idea in the Ordo-liberal tradition, present in one form or another throughout 
its various incarnations, it is the commitment to a stable system of rules for socio-economic 
activity. Ordnungspolitik evokes an ideal of political order in which agents of the state design 
an enduring framework to underpin the functioning of market society.
3
 As is well known, 
Ordo-liberals have typically referred to this framework as an “economic constitution” 
(Wirtschaftsverfassung), drawing on ideas already in circulation by the early 1900s and 
fashioning them into the cornerstone of their construction.
4
 
Adjacent to this concept in the Ordo-liberal tradition are a range of more abstract 
ideas informing it, as well as a set of more specific prescriptions. Amongst the former are the 
assumption that the economy forms an integrated system, that market and state can exist in a 
complementary relation,
5
 and various underlying ethical ideas including the view that fairness 
requires the alignment of risk and responsibility, an emphasis on individual freedom, and a 
corresponding current of scepticism towards democracy. Amongst the more concrete 
prescriptions are a range of policy commitments, such as endorsement of private ownership, 
opposition to monopoly power, and the central importance ascribed to price stability, as well 
as evolving views on the monetary policies that can foster this and the institutions conducive 
to upholding them in a given time and place.
6
 The idea of Ordnung expressed in an economic 
constitution mediates all these features of Ordo-liberal thought: it is a central concept in the 
                                                 
3
  For historical and analytical overviews, see David J. Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German 
Neo-liberalism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe”, (1994) 42 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, pp. 25-84; Viktor J. Vanberg, “The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism”, Paper 04/11, 
2004 (Freiburg: Walter Eucken Institut); Werner Bonefeld, “Freedom and the Strong State: On German 
Ordoliberalism”, (2012) 17 New Political Economy, pp. 633-56; Thomas Biebricher, “Europe and the 
Political Philosophy of Neoliberalism”, (2013) 12 Contemporary Political Theory, pp. 338-75. 
4
  On the history of the concept before its adoption by Franz Böhm, see Knut Wolfgang Nörr, “‘Economic 
Constitution’: On the Roots of a Legal Concept”, (1994) 11 Journal of Law and Religion, pp. 343-54. 
5
  That the market-economic and the constitutional are, as one might say, “co-original”; let us set aside the 
question of whether this interdependence is conceptual or empirical. 
6
  See, for example, on competition law, Gerber, note 3 above, pp. 52-3. 
 3 
tradition, notwithstanding the tradition’s evolution.
7
 
This commitment is commonly understood to express deep opposition to executive 
discretion, as Ordo-liberal thinkers themselves have emphasised. Franz Böhm wrote warmly 
of an “automatically functioning coordination system” that would “restrict [the state] to the 
task of defining the structural framework” and “severely limit political discretion”.
8
 Walter 
Eucken, in a discussion of monetary policy, evoked the ideal of “rational automatism”.
9
 
Political agents were to operate within sharply demarcated parameters. Partly as a function of 
a technocratic concern for the coherence of economic policy,
10
 partly the consequence of 
fears of state capture by private interests, for Ordo-liberals the point has been to constrain 
political action with rules. Following a foundational moment of adoption – the point at which 
a market economy, by “an explicit and uncompromising decision”,
11
 was embraced by the 
community and thereby put beyond further contestation – things were to unfold in a closely 
constrained fashion. 
To be sure, this was never a model of social order without the state. There is a class of 
initiatives that political agents were expected to engage in – those “formal” actions which 
                                                 
7
  See Vanberg, note 3 above, p. 6. 
8
  As Böhm writes: “the individual plans of members of society would be controlled with the help of an 
automatically functioning coordination system. This would relieve the state of the task of central economic 
control and would restrict it to the task of defining the structural framework which would preserve and 
enforce observance of the control laws. Moreover, the role of the state in the overall enforcement of this 
system would be so constituted that it would severely limit political discretion. If a political decision was 
taken to adopt such a system, then the rules would be laid down as to: (i) the task of the legislator, (ii) the 
role and duties of the government and (iii) the principles by which the courts would interpret the law. This 
system is based upon an instrumental and procedural ‘score’ of a predominantly standard character which 
has been worked out to the last detail. The margin of discretion given to the autonomous members of society 
is limited by the peculiarity of their coordinated actions and by the consequent special feature of objective 
mutual interdependence. The margin of discretion given to persons with political authority is limited by the 
compulsion to submit to the mechanism of control which is laid down as in a musical score, as a modest-I 
should like to say both socially and politically harmless-minimum. This minimum, though it leaves many 
options open to the creative imagination which conforms to the system, nevertheless severely restricts the 
possibilities of ignoring the score and acting in a manner which does not conform to the system by setting 
the furies of economic and political disaster on the heels of the sinners.” (See Franz Böhm, “Rule of Law in 
a Market Economy”, in: Alan T. Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds), Germany’s Social Market Economy: 
Origins and Evolution, (London: MacMillan, 1989), pp. 62-3 (a translation of Böhm, 
“Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft”, ORDO, (1966) Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft 17, pp.75-152.) 
9
  Walter Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik, (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1965), p. 263. 
10
  See Walter Eucken in: Peacock and Willgerodt, note 8 above, p. 32. Note also the religious inspiration 
behind Ordo-liberalism which further promotes the holistic outlook: see Philip Manow, “Ordoliberalismus 
als ökonomische Ordnungstheologie”, (2001) 29 Leviathan, pp. 179-98. 
11
  Wilhelm Röpke, “Is the German Economic Policy the Right One?”, in: Horst Frierich Wünsch (ed), 
Standard Texts on the Social Market Economy—Two Centuries of Discussion, (Stuttgart-New York: Gustav 
Fischer, [1950] 1982), p. 39. 
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serve to maintain, perfect and update the economic constitution. These were to be formal in 
the sense that they did not serve particular economic ends but established the conditions 
under which such ends could be pursued. They would shape the “framework” of economic 
activity, but not entail efforts to “control the productive process itself”.
12
 They were to be 
indifferent to the substantive outcomes they led to, and were certainly not to be responsive to 
public opinion.
13
 Thus there was a category under which significant state action could be 
envisaged – but always on behalf of constraining discretion in conformity with the principles 
of the economic constitution.
14
 
The reluctance with which political agents should consider breaking with the 
principles of their economic system – though also the suggestion that sometimes they may 
have to – was well expressed by Wilhelm Röpke: 
“Any emphatic call for a homogeneous national economic policy implies that the 
various segments of this policy (prices, marketing, foreign trade, agriculture, money 
and banking, the capital market etc) must correlate with each other so as to present a 
uniform whole rather than various parts reciprocally cancelling each other out. […] It 
seems a cheap argument to designate this demand and its concomitant policy 
‘doctrinaire’. Naturally, economic policy ought to remain flexible in regard to its 
details and guard against the danger of tarring everything with the same brush. A 
systematic consistent policy such as that recommended here does not signify that no 
exceptions should or could be made. Nevertheless, it must at the same time always be 
dominated by the fear that concessions on the crucial points or even a series of 
concessions will militate against the overall system which will disrupt it and finally 
generate further concessions in the direction of government controls.”
15
 
 
                                                 
12
  Eucken 1986 / 1948, p.275. 
13
  Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken and Hans Großmann-Dörth, “The Ordo Manifesto of 1936”, in: Peacock and 
Willgerodt, note 8 above, p. 23; see, also, Röpke, note 11 above, on the difference between “market-
conforming” and “non-conforming” measures. See also Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures 
at the Collège de France, 1978-9, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 171. 
14
  It is noticeable that some of the earliest formulations of these ideas, the scope for legitimate state 
intervention was drawn quite inclusively. In the proto-Ordoliberal thought of Alexander Rüstow, the state is 
bound in its actions simply by the “laws of the market”: “I think there exists a third type of attitude, which 
would be the correct and modern mode of production. If we were agreed that every new condition of 
equilibrium which arose in the normal way was the most appropriate solution even though many frictional 
losses and disagreeable phases had to be overcome en route, it would seem highly advisable to try to achieve 
this condition without delay and to reduce to zero the interim period which would otherwise slowly pass 
until a new and durable set of circumstances could be established – an interim period marked by hopeless 
struggle, by decline and by distress. That would be interference in precisely the opposite direction to that in 
which we have hitherto proceeded, i.e. not contrary to the laws of the market but in conformity with them: 
not to maintain the old situation but to bring about a new one, not to delay the natural course of events but to 
accelerate it. With this in mind, our recommendation is for a form of liberal interventionism under the motto 
‘fata volentemducunt, nolentemtrahunt’ [the fates lead the willing and drag the unwilling].” Alexander 
Rüstow, “Liberal Intervention”, in: Wünsch, note 11 above, pp. 184-5. 
15
  Röpke, note 11 above, p. 38. 
 5 
The approach chimes well with a conception of the market economy as something 
that, if sufficiently well-ordered, achieves a measure of equilibrium. If one can assume such 
an economy does not feature endogenous tendencies towards periods of extreme upheaval 
and unacceptable social costs, it may be tenable to conceive good policy as purely “formal” 
in the sense described.
16
 What though if there are destructive forces in the economy that 
threaten moments of great instability and distress? The work of Keynes and others has long 
emphasised the volatile aspects of the market economy – the centrality of “confidence”, the 
problem of “speculation”, and so on.
17
 An economic model committed to constraining the 
sphere of state action may clearly face a distinctive set of challenges should it ever have to 
confront these more volatile tendencies in the market economy – features all the more visible 
in more recent forms of financial capitalism, where contagion has become a thematic 
problem. 
Moreover, the Ordo-liberal policy regime is only ever likely to be applied in a world 
that is not wholly Ordo-liberal – where other countries pursue different models, that is, or 
imperfectly execute the same. The context of Ordo-liberalism’s enactment is likely to be one 
that, if not outright hostile, is at least liable to present frictions. Where rival powers pursue 
policies that deviate from Ordo-liberal precepts, an important source of uncertainty is 
introduced into the economic system. How then does the Ordo-liberal declared aversion to 
political discretion fare in the context of the pathologies and distortions of a market economy, 
and what options does it leave available in the face of an economic shock?
18
 
The question carries added relevance given the prospect that the Ordo-liberal 
emphasis on stable rules of policy itself contains the seeds of instability, at least when applied 
                                                 
16
  Leaving aside for now the question of democracy. 
17
  See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, (London: MacMillan, 
1936), especially Chapter 12. The emphasis is on tendencies that depart from what might be viewed 
objectively rational – how, for instance, assessments of value involve predictions of how others will assess 
the same, introducing a degree of uncertainty that detaches behaviour from the economic fundamentals and 
creates the potential for great fluctuations (see pp. 100 et seq.). 
18
  This is often said to be a weak point of Ordo-liberalism: see Mathias Siems and Gerhard Schnyder, 
“Ordoliberal Lessons for Economic Stability: Different Kinds of Regulation, Not More Regulation”, (2014) 
27 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, pp. 377-396, at 386 & 
389, on “doubts about whether a rigid Ordoliberalism can help to address severe financial crises”. See, also, 
the sympathetic analysis in Feld et al., note 2 above, p. 14, where contagion – undiscussed in the founding 
texts of Ordo-liberalism – is noted to be at the heart of the mismatch between responsibility and liability that 
Ordo-liberals abhor. 
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in certain settings.
19
 An accent on strictly “formal” interventions alone arguably entails a 
degree of blindness to contextual variations in economic conditions. This may be true cross-
spatially, as numerous critics of “one-size-fits-all” policy-making in the European Union 
have observed.
20
 Rules intended to be neutral in their treatment of actors always carry the risk 
of treating unequals equally, with difficult implications both economic and political. The 
point holds also cross-temporally: an emphasis on a stable policy regime inevitably faces the 
problem of how to adapt to changing conditions. It has long been argued that the proliferation 
of policy rules leads to rigidity, and where periodic major shifts in policy are excluded, 
unforeseen situations will typically provoke last-minute unconventional actions. Even if the 
idea of an economic constitution admits the possibility of periodically introducing new rules, 
it may suggest a reluctance to expunge old ones, with similar challenging implications. I do 
not wish to suggest that Ordo-liberals are without resources to address these questions, but it 
remains the case that the prospect of disequilibrium must be reckoned with for reasons 
internal as well as external to the core commitments of Ordo-liberalism. 
III.  THE PLACE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY IN THE ORDO-LIBERAL 
TRADITION 
For the committed Ordo-liberal, clearly one response to difficult times is to stand by the 
existing rules framework. The advice to political agents will be to restrict themselves to 
actions regarded as merely formal, preserving thereby an order in which discretion is highly 
constrained.
21
 This may be rationalised with the idea that more harm than good is done by 
putting the integrity of the framework in question, combined with efforts to downplay the 
negative outcomes arising. 
There are a number of reasons why this response may be unsatisfactory, even from 
within the Ordo-liberal outlook. Not only may it involve ignoring high socio-economic costs, 
but it may sit badly with other Ordo-liberal commitments, including the ethical principle that 
actors be held responsible for their actions (the Haftungsprinzip). Upholding this principle 
                                                 
19
  Given that ideas are never perfectly instituted in practice, this idea is more an intuition than a testable 
hypothesis. 
20
  Christian Joerges, “What is left of the European Economic Constitution II? From Pyrrhic Victory to Cannae 
Defeat”, in: Poul F. Kjaer and Niklas Olsen (eds), Critical Theories of Crisis in Europe: From Weimar to the 
Euro, (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); Wolfgang Streeck, Gekaufte Zeit. Die vertagte Krise des 
demokratischen Kapitalismus (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013). 
21
  Such a position may in practice look rather similar then to Austrian neo-liberalism and its avowed wariness 
of all kinds of political intervention in the market. 
 7 
may require interventions hard to conceive as merely “formal”: indeed, it may require 
reconfiguring economic relations precisely so as to influence substantive outcomes. When 
mechanisms such as contagion are in play – or simply when they cannot be excluded –
interventions may need to be targeted at particular actors if these wider principles are to be 
maintained. Clearly, the point is only further underlined if one accepts that an Ordo-liberal 
preference for stable rules may itself be a contributing factor to economic instability. 
Is there scope then for more radical actions? One possibility is to declare an exception 
to the rules framework, thereby seeking both to uphold the framework and stave off the 
effects of its dogmatic application.
22
 This is the kind of response implied by Röpke in the 
passage cited above, and is mirrored in other more recent Ordo-liberal writings.
23
 
Importantly, such a move is likely to depend on casting the situation as a wholly exceptional 
one in which the usual constraints on political discretion do not apply.
24
 The Ordo-liberal 
presumption that the state’s relations with the market can be founded on stable rules requires 
that difficult times be framed as moments of emergency. Precisely because the model is so 
wary of permitting exceptions, the situations in which discretionary initiatives are pursued 
must be cast as exceptional – situations in which actions are grounded in necessity. In this 
way the Ordo-liberal emphasis on a constitutional framework of policy-making would seem 
to invite the escalation of political rhetoric – a politics of emergency – when interventions 
hard to subsume under the heading of “formal” are pursued. 
A second coherent response from within the Ordo-liberal viewpoint is to deny that a 
genuine rules framework is in existence, previous impressions notwithstanding, and to assert 
that it now needs to be established. The present generation may be repositioned, in other 
words, not as the inheritor of an economic constitution but as back at the founding moment 
when a decision for the (Ordo-liberal) model is to be taken. As we have noted, Ordo-liberal 
thought has tended to cast this moment as one of legitimate political discretion – the moment 
                                                 
22
  See David M. Woodruff, “Governing by Panic: The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis”, (2016) 44 Politics & 
Society, p. 97, on exceptionalism as the implication of Ordo-liberal rule consequentialism. 
23
  See, for example, Viktor J. Vanberg, “Ordnungspolitik, The Freiburg School and the Reason of Rules”, 
(2014) Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik 14 (1), p. 15: “prudence does indeed require 
us to acknowledge that there may be emergency situations in which we need to temporarily disband rules 
that in ordinary times we consider binding.” 
24
  For a closer discussion of ideas of exceptionalism and emergency powers in Röpke’s thought, see Werner 
Bonefeld, “Authoritarian Liberalism: From Schmitt via Ordoliberalism to the Euro”, (2016) Critical 
Sociology, online early. 
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of discretion to end discretion.
25
 Also a form of “extraordinary” politics,
26
 it is not quite the 
same as exceptionalism: the rules to which it is oriented are those-to-come rather than those 
already in force. But like the exceptionalist response, it invites the framing of the situation as 
one of urgent necessity. To commit decisively to a new framework of rules generally requires 
viewing the status quo as wholly unsustainable, as a state of disorder to be contrasted with the 
order-to-come. 
It is in the nature of arguments from exception and foundation that they are difficult to 
ward off. Deciding whether a situation warrants extraordinary action is clearly a matter of 
judgement– nothing in the objective nature of the circumstances themselves or the political 
apparatus that confronts them can settle this. A departure from the rules framework is 
therefore a persistent possibility, not one restricted to a particular context. Moreover, as those 
with a privileged vantage-point on political developments, and typically with claims to 
expertise in the socio-economic issues at stake, decision-makers are well placed to make this 
judgement in a way that others may struggle to refute. 
It is worth emphasising in this context that both scenarios of extraordinary politics are 
well in keeping with the technocratic tendency in Ordo-liberalism. Already in its early 
formulation by the Freiburg thinkers, the approach was consciously conceived as a project to 
be advanced by the “men of science” of law and political economy, as those able to stand 
back from private interests and take an objective view of the economic system in all its 
complexity.
27
 The very idea of an economic constitution, as a project of finding the technical 
means to institutionalise principles taken as agreed and settled, reflects this general 
inspiration. If the Ordo-liberal aspiration in times of uncertainty is to stick with the existing 
rules framework, this demands that initiatives be cast as simply technical adjustments to 
existing constitutional commitments (as “formal” in the sense described). Standards of 
democratic political justification, involving comparison of competing options and the 
acknowledgement of competing values, are likely to be deliberately eschewed. To the extent, 
on the other hand, that sticking with the rules framework is deemed unfeasible, and the Ordo-
                                                 
25
  This is how the West German currency reform of 20 June 1948 tends to be portrayed in the Ordo-liberal 
tradition: see, notably, Ludwig Erhard, “The New Facts”, in: Wünsch, note 11, especially p. 35. 
26
  Kalyvas 2008. 
27
  See the Ordo-liberal manifesto of 1936, with its explicit aim to combat fatalism and relativism and to renew 
confidence in what science could achieve (in Peacock and Willgerodt, note 8 above, p. 16 & 21). The 
position of the Austrian neo-liberals was, of course, quite different, with von Hayek tending to denounce 
such aspirations as “scientism”. 
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liberal encounter with crisis leads to exceptionalism and/or reconstitution, the technocratic 
tendency is again undergirded. Suspending rules, as well as adopting new ones as an 
indivisible package, typically relies on a claim to special insight – not just the knowledge of 
how rules are to be followed, but an understanding of the ideas that inform them (the “spirit” 
of the rules) so that the decision to waive them can be presented as authoritative. It is exactly 
in such moves that the claim to expertise is performed. 
I have suggested that the Ordo-liberal tradition invites economic situations to be 
approached in a dichotomous fashion: either as part of the “normal” conditions which can be 
handled by the merely formal state interventions associated with the economic constitution; 
or – should such efforts prove unworkable – as exceptional situations warranting an 
extraordinary response of some sort. Being strongly committed to a certain understanding of 
order encourages any challenge not easily absorbed within that framework to be cast as the 
threat of far-reaching disorder, to be staved off by radical means. The attempt to heavily 
constrain political discretion paradoxically makes thinkable the possibility of far-reaching 
discretion unconstrained by the usual norms of politics and political justification. Missing we 
might say is the third position, in which it is recognised that even the best policy regimes will 
always be challenged by difficult situations necessitating discretion (not to mention the 
democratic rationale for change), and that the question is therefore how to ensure such 
situations are not as cast as wholly exceptional but rather are handled in accordance with 
political norms. 
The Ordo-liberal emphasis is, one may note, on an economic constitution rather than a 
political constitution structuring the procedures of the polity more generally.
28
 It primarily 
seeks to constrain the kinds of economic policy that political agents can pursue rather than the 
ways in which they may initiate and enforce policy. This is an important distinction, since 
there is nothing in the idea of fidelity to a certain set of economic principles that implies 
constraints on political discretion more generally. Indeed, it may be that a strong commitment 
to upholding rules of policy may invite great latitude in the procedures by which this is 
achieved. The early phases of Ordo-liberal thought famously emphasized the importance of a 
strong state that was, as it were, (legally) unencumbered to do what (economically) it must – 
                                                 
28
  Although the notion of an “economic constitution” looks something like a bid to draw on the prestige of 
constitutional terminology to describe what is ultimately a policy regime, the distinction is additionally 
blurred in English by the use of the same word to translate (Wirtschafts)verfassung and Grundgesetz. 
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hence the familiar depiction of it as tending towards authoritarian liberalism.
29
 Even if we 
acknowledge that later iterations of the tradition were more interested in questions of an 
overarching rule of law,
30
 it remains true that these larger aspects of constitutionalism have 
been relatively neglected in Ordo-liberal thought. 
IV.  DISCUSSION: RULES AND DISCRETION IN THE EURO CRISIS 
Has the handling of the Euro crisis been consistent with the picture described? Certainly we 
have seen major departures from existing policy regimes pushed through by executive 
discretion. Some have been defended as temporary measures intended to restore short-term 
stability, such as the European Financial Stability Facility. Such instances are consistent with 
the logic of exception: understood as responses to exceptional circumstances, they are treated 
as restorative moves, intended merely to reset the existing rules framework. Often their 
proponents have gone to great lengths to avoid actions that might resemble a decisive break 
with the pre-crisis order – the reluctance to approve debt write-offs, or even bailouts, being a 
well-known example. 
Other measures on the other hand– the later ones especially – instead look rather more 
like efforts to initiate a substantially new rules-based regime. Prominent amongst these are 
the Fiscal Compact, Six-Pack and Two-Pack. These moves have typically been coupled with 
the portrayal of the pre-crisis regime as essentially dysfunctional, as rules-based only in 
name. Emblematic in this respect was the blueprint for the future of the Eurozone released by 
the head of the European Council in 2012, entitled “Towards a Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union”.
31
 Exactly by suggesting that the existing rules-order was bogus, its authors 
invoked the license needed to wield far-reaching discretion in the service of establishing a 
new one. The creative redeployment of EU institutional powers (notably of the Commission), 
the circumvention or compression of national-parliamentary debate, as well as the use of 
extra-EU mechanisms to marginalise the European Parliament, are just some of the actions 
                                                 
29
  Classically, see Hermann Heller (1933), ‘Autoritärer Liberalismus’, Die Neue Rundschau 44, pp. 289–298; 
see, also, Dieter Haselbach, Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft: Gesellschaft und Politik 
im Ordoliberalismus, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1991). See, also, Bonefeld, note 24 above. 
30
  See, also, Volker Berghahn and Brigitte Young, “Reflections on Werner Bonefeld’s ‘Freedom and the 
Strong State: One German Ordoliberalism’”, (2013) 18 New Political Economy, pp. 768-78 (contra Werner 
Bonefeld, note 3 above). 
31
  “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”, Report by President of the European Council Herman 
Van Rompuy, 5 December 2012, available at:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf. 
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taken to this effect. 
By framing the economic situation as one of emergency, unconventional moves at 
odds both with a commitment to stable rules of policy and with basic constitutional norms 
have been adopted as last-minute responses to urgent problems.
32
 To the extent that these 
problems are indeed pressing, arguably they arise in significant part from a reluctance to 
confront the pathologies of financial capitalism, with structural problems of state capture, 
speculation and contagion overlooked in favour of the localisation of blame and an insistence 
on the avoidance of moral hazard.
33
 The new policy regimes arising are intended to bind 
decision-makers more tightly to “responsible” economics by giving it the status of a 
constitutional commitment.
34
 
In short: using the only justifications that Ordo-liberals could accept, interventions 
anathema to their instincts have been employed, to handle challenges their own ideas allowed 
to develop, with the aim of reconstituting the economic system to be immune to such threats 
in future. 
One line of argument treats the actions of the German government in the context of 
the Euro crisis as directly inspired by Ordo-liberal thinking. As one author puts it, “The crisis 
initially got worse as a result of too close an adherence to Ordo-liberalism, and it only started 
to go away as those same ideas were partially deserted”.
35
 Compelling as this thesis may be, 
the risk is that it overstates the influence of one agent – the German government – in a 
situation characterised by the interplay of multiple agents not always with converging 
agendas.
36
 Also, it understates the influence of other brands of liberal-economic thought, 
particularly the Chicago-School neo-liberalism that has been a major influence on the ECB 
                                                 
32
  Jonathan White, “Authority after Emergency Rule”, (2015) 78 Modern Law Review, pp. 585-610, idem, 
“Emergency Europe”, (2015) 63 Political Studies, pp 300-18, and idem, “Politicizing Europe: The Challenge 
of Executive Discretion”, in: Sara Hobolt and Olaf Cramme, Democratic Politics in a European Union 
under Stress, note 1 above, pp. x. 
33
  See, for example, Matthias Matthijs, “Powerful Rules Governing the Euro: The Perverse Logic of German 
Ideas”, (2016) 23 Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 375-91. 
34
  On the relevant aspects of the Fiscal Compact, see White, “Authority after Emergency Rule”, note 32 above. 
35
  See Matthijs, note 35 above, p. 380. See, also, David Schäfer, “A Banking Union of Ideas? The Impact of 
Ordoliberalism and the Vicious Circle on the EU Banking Union”, (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market 
Studies, pp. 961–80, and supporting quotations therein concerning Schäuble’s own Ordo-liberal convictions; 
see also Peter Nedergaard and Holly Snaith (2015), ‘“As I Drifted on a River I Could Not Control”: The 
Unintended Ordoliberal Consequences of the Eurozone Crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (5), 
pp. 1094–1109; for critical discussion, see Feld et al., note 2 above. 
36
  See the IMF and ECB as two agents whose actions are hard to subsume under the Ordo-liberal label. 
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and branches of the Commission in recent decades. If anything, these ideas are more 
conducive to the politics of emergency, since they foresee large scope for executive 
discretion in the service of an agenda of “competitiveness”.
37
 There is a problem of over-
determination, in other words, that should make us cautious in linking the EU’s crisis 
management too closely to one body of thought alone.
38
 
But one does not need to evoke unity of programme in this way, and attribute to it 
causal status, in order to concede the relevance of Ordo-liberalism to recent EU decisions.
39
 
The significance of this set of ideas, it can be said, lies rather in encouraging the avoidance or 
postponement of certain lines of action, in suggesting certain kinds of justification for actions 
once undertaken, and in prompting limited resistance to such manoeuvres from others (be 
they parliamentary figures in the political mainstream or opinion leaders in the media). Ordo-
liberalism establishes a sensibility, possibly largely tacit, for certain kinds of response. If the 
EU’s politics of emergency in this period has sources well beyond the influence of one 
ideological tradition, it remains possible that, at least in this sense, Ordo-liberalism was an 
enabling factor. 
Importantly, and as I have tried to argue, it is not plausible to discount the influence of 
Ordo-liberalism simply by observing that the Euro crisis has been as much about acts of 
executive discretion as about the constraining force of binding rules. Certainly, the emphasis 
in the Ordo-liberal tradition has always been on this latter aspect – on a system sufficiently 
structured by rules that it becomes “automatically functioning” – and the recurrent calls to 
strengthen the rules of the Eurozone are the features of the crisis period most in tune with the 
Ordo-liberal outlook.
40
 The fact that the exercise of discretion has in no sense been banished 
from the emerging Eurozone regime
41
 is testament certainly to its imperfections from an 
Ordo-liberal perspective. But the larger observation, I suggest, is that the very commitment to 
the idea of a stable and binding economic constitution has always implied the prospect of 
challenging situations being handled in far more discretionary fashion (in the service, of 
                                                 
37
  See, for example, William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of 
Competition, (London: Sage Publications, 2014). 
38
  Though, on this, see Biebricher, “Europe and the Political Philosophy of Neoliberalism”, note 3 above, and, 
idem, “The Return of Ordoliberalism in Europe − Notes on a Research Agenda”, (2014) 9 I-lex, pp. 1-24. 
39
  I take some inspiration here from Quentin Skinner, “Moral Principles and Social Change”, in: idem, Visions 
of Politics Vol I: Regarding Method, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
40
  See Feld et al., note 2 above, p.10. 
41
  See Scharpf, note 1 above. 
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course, of strict rules), coupled with their framing as matters of high emergency. It is exactly 
the dialectical combination of rules and extraordinary discretion which is arguably 
characteristic of Ordo-liberalism in its “actually existing” form. 
The distinctiveness of the EU setting, as a post-sovereign order, is that it makes this 
entwinement more pronounced and visible. Although at one level there would seem to be a 
special affinity between the Ordo-liberal tradition and the transnational context – the 
voluntarily-embraced rules of an “economic constitution” promise to substitute for the 
absence of political hierarchy, and to establish order without popular interference – at the 
same time this context raises peculiar challenges for it. The disparity of economic conditions 
across the Eurozone makes the principle of limiting intervention to merely formal, rule-based 
approaches more difficult than ever to sustain. The insistence for political reasons on 
territorialising Ordo-liberal ideas of responsibility and liability, such that states become their 
carriers,
42
 creates pressure for conditionality requirements and national vetoes that have more 
to do with discretion than rules.
43
 The problem of contagion is more pronounced given the 
interdependence of Eurozone economies. The weakness of the EU as a constitutional order in 
the conventional sense means there are fewer legal constraints on what agents can do in the 
service of an “economic constitution”. The lack of a dominant political agent able to exercise 
uncontested authority, in the manner of the government of a nation-state, means the exercise 
of political discretion can be especially chaotic, involving as it must the collaboration of 
multiple agents, and the appeal to the politics of emergency especially tempting as a means to 
galvanise action. All these are ways in which the combination of rules and extraordinary 
discretion becomes especially clear in the EU context; the combination itself though seems a 
characteristic implication of the Ordo-liberal standpoint. 
The discretionary handling of legal and political norms – of sovereignty, democracy 
and others – in the name of strict policy rules: if this is what one witnesses today, then 
arguably it is the inverse of how many would want things to be. Instead of constitutional 
discretion to entrench a certain set of policies, a strong constitutional order that enables the 
                                                 
42
  See Schäfer, note 35 above. 
43
  On the asymmetric bargaining and threat of force involved, see Scharpf, note 1 above; Damian Chalmers, 
“Crisis reconfiguration of the European constitutional state”, in: Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs 
and Christian Joerges (eds.), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Magnus Ryner, “Europe’s Ordoliberal Iron Cage: Critical 
Political Economy, the Euro Area Crisis and its Management”, (2015) 22 Journal of European Public 
Policy, pp. 275-94; and Woodruff, note 22 above. 
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orderly contestation of policies is arguably a preferable arrangement, certainly more in 
keeping with ideals of collective self-determination. Rather than aiming to reduce political 
discretion to the bare minimum, with all the potential for extraordinary action this entails, 
there would seem to be no substitute for establishing the institutional structures that enable it 
to take legitimate form, as the considered interventions of agents responsive to contending 
opinion rather than as the last-minute improvisations of technocratic elites. 
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